Labour migration from Kenya was oriented towards Africa, North America and Europe until the 1990s. Kenyans then started moving to the Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. Most Kenyan labour migrants to the Gulf perform low-waged work, the women in domestic occupations and the men as security guards.
By 2025 over 300,000 Kenyans were working in three Gulf countries – Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. A few thousand more were stationed in Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait.
The remittances sent to Kenya from workers abroad grew exponentially. In 1990 remittances totalled just under US$140 million, accounting for 1.6% of Kenya’s GDP. By 2024 this was US$5 billion, 4.2% of GDP.
Evidence of migrant workers suffering human rights abuses has remained a constant source of tension, however. Workers have reported forced labour, working excessive hours without rest in violation of contracts and labour standards, and restrictions on freedom of movement. Threats, humiliation, intimidation, isolation, and physical or sexual abuse have also been reported.
In the early 2010s the media began reporting distress calls from migrants. Nonprofit organisations also began putting pressure on the Kenyan government to act. The outcry led the government to impose a ban on migration to Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia. It also extended its regulation of labour migration. The ban to Saudi Arabia was lifted in 2016 after a bilateral agreement was signed.
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Yet distress cases continued. By late 2021 a report from the Kenyan Senate Committee on Labour and Social Welfare called for a renewed ban on migration.
As researchers we have worked on different aspects of migration for many years. We recently completed a project focusing on origin countries’ policies surrounding low-waged labour migration. In a recent paper we explored the case of Kenyan migration to Saudi Arabia. The study involved interviews with Kenyan stakeholders and analysis of policy documents, government statements and news reports. We looked at how Kenya balances an economic strategy of emigration with protection of its citizens from rights violations abroad.
Our findings were that the Kenyan government has prioritised increasing labour migration over protection of workers.
Re-engagement with Saudi Arabia
On assuming office in 2022, President William Ruto promised to battle Kenya’s high unemployment by creating a million jobs abroad for Kenyan workers. With a goal of raising annual remittances to US$10 billion, Kenya looked to Saudi Arabia to help achieve this. As the cabinet secretary for foreign affairs explained:
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia wishes to get more Kenyans employed in their country and we will play our part as a government to ensure that more Kenyans can work and earn well working in Saudi Arabia.
A series of high level diplomatic meetings between Kenya and Saudi Arabia took place in the early months of the new government. Kenyan officials then presented Saudi Arabia as a safe destination for Kenyan workers.
As one of the people we spoke to explained:
The perception of Saudi Arabia as bad will change, we (the government) are the ones to change it.
The government insisted that rights abuses originated in Kenya. It blamed rogue Kenyan employment agencies, and promised actions aimed at improving and regulating labour migration out of Kenya.
In 2023 Kenya’s national assembly approved the National Policy on Labour Migration. Its aims included improving coordination of labour migration governance, promotion of foreign employment and protection of Kenyan migrant workers.
In 2024 the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection put in place airport screening checks to protect against document fraud. However, by 2025 many of the promised interventions had failed to materialise. These included safe houses in Saudi Arabia for workers seeking to escape abuse, and more labour attachés to monitor the implementation of bilateral agreements and handle complaints.
Taken at face value, the government’s insistence that recruitment practices in Kenya lie at the root of abuse would favour an increase in pre-departure training and better education for migrants about their rights. Yet, in late 2024, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection announced it was reducing the amount of pre-departure training for labour migrants. And, despite frequent statements on signing Bilateral Labour Agreements, no new agreement with Saudi Arabia has been made public.
Income versus protection
Our analysis indicates that the Kenyan government’s reluctance to improve protection is driven by three things.
First, pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia. A report from a 2021 Senate investigation shows that Saudi officials pressured Kenyan officials to present a better public picture of working conditions in Saudi Arabia. The recent reductions in pre-departure training time seem to have come at the request of employers in Saudi Arabia.
Second, Kenya’s vulnerability to this pressure. Saudi Arabia represents the second largest source of remittances back to Kenya, hosts the largest Kenyan diaspora in the Gulf countries and shows openness to increasing the number of Kenyan workers.
Interviews indicated a prevailing view that putting too many protection measures in place would cause Kenya to lose job opportunities to workers from other countries such as Ethiopia. Moreover, the government’s insistence on increasing labour migration as a way to reduce unemployment may make Kenya susceptible to destination country demands for more limited rights protections.
Third, political interest in the recruitment sector. Many respondents pointed to the recruitment industry as a source of abuses such as contract substitution.
The Labour Migration Bill, which aims to regulate the recruitment industry, has been stalled since 2024. Aligned with information we received, a recent New York Times exposé revealed that regulation is hampered by the fact that many agencies are owned by high ranking politicians. This implies politicians have a financial stake in ongoing recruitment and minimal oversight.
Going forward
If the Kenyan government wishes to continue to encourage labour emigration, it should look for ways to combine this with protection. Improving its migration bureaucracy would allow Kenya to strengthen its negotiating position with destination countries while also improving protection.
A bureaucracy that weeds out bad recruitment agencies and has control over its labour migrant population – for example through credential checks, training and community outreach – is highly desirable for destination countries.
Better protection would also improve Kenya’s negotiating position by demonstrating that it will not make deals at any cost in order to meet campaign promises.
