More than any other U.S. president in decades, Donald Trump has aggressively pursued military interventions in Latin America.
On Jan. 3, 2026, U.S. special forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on charges of narco-terrorism. In the months before the operation, U.S. Southern Command began targeting small, fast-moving boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. The death toll from the continuing war on these alleged narco-terrorists has risen to over 200 people.
At the heart of these events is the Trump administration’s stated goal of combating drug trafficking organizations. The White House and State Department have designated a plethora of guerrilla groups, drug cartels, gangs and criminal enterprises as “foreign terrorist organizations.”
Washington has also expanded security ties with Ecuador and El Salvador, which are led by right-wing Trump allies. At the same time, the administration has pressured left-wing governments in Colombia, Guatemala, Brazil and Mexico to join the U.S. war on drugs or else risk Trump’s wrath.
When it comes to opening legal avenues for the application of armed force, the narco-terrorism label is useful. Indeed, it is how the Trump administration justified Operation Absolute Resolve to capture and indict Maduro. Yet Trump’s decision to pardon a right-wing ally – former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández – who was convicted and sentenced to 45 years in prison for drug trafficking and related weapons offenses, appeared to some observers to be “at odds with Trump’s war on drugs.”
The history of that war on drugs, however, especially during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, shows that the narco-terrorism label has always been politicized. My research on Reagan and the drug war suggests that the nebulousness of the concept aided U.S. policymakers in achieving fundamentally anti-communist and anti-leftist political objectives.
Shining Path and the roots of narco-terrorism
Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry first coined the term narco-terrorism in 1982 to describe the infiltration of Sendero Luminoso – or Shining Path – guerrillas into the drug trade.
An ultraradical offshoot of the Peruvian Communist Party, Shining Path was one of the most vicious insurgencies in Latin America. A truth and reconciliation commission later attributed at least half of the 70,000 conflict-related deaths and disappearances to the Maoist guerrillas in their campaign to overthrow the “bourgeois” democratic government. After the Peruvian army chased the guerrillas out of their home base in Ayacucho in the southern Andes, they moved north to the upper Huallaga Valley, the source of over half the world’s cocaine supply at the time.
The Peruvian police, together with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, created special counternarcotics units focused on crop eradication in the upper Huallaga. This strategy sought to reduce the supply of cocaine by eliminating its source, the coca plant. Peasant growers’ resistance to these operations fueled the Shining Path insurgency by providing recruits and creating an opening for the guerrillas to interpose themselves between the farmers and the police.
AP Photo / Mark Schiefelbein
With the Cold War drawing to a close, a militarized drug war expanded under the administration of George H.W. Bush. As the federal counternarcotics budget nearly doubled, U.S. officials pressured the Peruvians to militarize their counternarcotics efforts, too. But it wasn’t until the Peruvian armed forces pursued a tacit truce with the traffickers that they were able to locate and capture Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán in September 1992 and dismantle the insurgency.
The Peruvian counterinsurgency succeeded due to a strategy that deliberately cut ties between the guerrillas and the drug traffickers. Essentially, the armed forces of Peru took control of the drug trade from the leftist guerrillas. U.S. anti-narcotics officials, together with their Peruvian police colleagues, were less than thrilled with this strategy – as were the tens of thousands of people who were caught in the crossfire. But for myriad U.S. defense officials more interested in defeating Shining Path than stemming the tide of drugs, the narco-terrorism label had facilitated a clear success – and drafted a valuable blueprint.
Colombia and the ‘narco-guerrilla connection’
The incident that indelibly linked the drug cartels and the communist guerrillas in the U.S. concept of narco-terrorism was the November 1985 M-19 siege of the Colombian Palace of Justice, the country’s supreme court. The M-19, or 19th of April movement, so named for a disputed election, had as a main objective to establish socialism in Colombia. The guerrillas took the high court hostage and intended to subject the then-president to a trial. The resulting clash with the military left nearly 100 people dead, including soldiers, guerrillas and 11 of the justices.
Allegations surfaced that Pablo Escobar, head of the notorious Medellín cartel, had paid M-19 for the raid. The guerrillas had apparently stolen hundreds of documents, including U.S. extradition requests for Escobar. Though this motive is still disputed – and even the U.S. ambassador in Bogotá emphasized that the “narco-guerrilla connection” had not been proven – the shocking event hardened U.S. public opinion against the new threat of narco-terrorism.
In April 1986 the Reagan administration issued National Security Decision Directive 221, officially linking counternarcotics and counterinsurgency in U.S. foreign policy. The declaration of drugs as a national security threat widened the scope of U.S. involvement in the Colombian counterinsurgency against entrenched communist guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army.
That cooperation continues to the present day, though it is currently jeopardized by hostility between Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro, himself a former member of M-19.
AP Photo / Scott Stewart
The selective application of trafficking claims
The narco-terrorism label was selectively applied not only to left-wing guerrillas but to the two communist governments in Latin America. The Reagan administration seized upon allegations of Nicaraguan and Cuban drug trafficking to influence U.S. public opinion at a time when the American people worried about becoming bogged down in another Vietnam-style quagmire.
Vietnam had shattered the foreign policy consensus around the containment of Soviet communism, but the 1980s crack cocaine epidemic created a powerful new rationale for U.S. intervention. After Congress, citing human rights concerns, restricted aid to the anti-communist Contra forces fighting Nicaragua’s left-wing Sandinista government, Reagan publicly accused the Sandinistas of drug trafficking.
The only evidence produced to support the charge was likely obtained as the result of a joint DEA-CIA sting operation involving Barry Seal, an American drug smuggler turned DEA informant later played by Tom Cruise in the Hollywood cinematic version of the sordid tale, “American Made.” Questions arose as to whether the Nicaraguan trafficker identified by the sting was even linked to anyone in the Sandinista government.
At the same time, the Reagan administration ignored allegations that the Contras themselves were smuggling cocaine into the U.S. Indeed, a Senate investigation spearheaded by U.S. Sen. John Kerry revealed that administration officials had repeatedly ignored or obstructed evidence of Contra drug trafficking. The CIA’s inspector general found that the agency had received but neglected to verify similar allegations.
These activities were tolerated because they raised money for a cause that Reagan and his supporters viewed as righteous. The Contras were seen as “freedom fighters” struggling to liberate Nicaragua from communism.
Coming full circle
Then, as now, Washington policymakers pursued a regional approach designed to strengthen security cooperation and bolster the military capabilities of allied nations.
In March 2026 the Trump administration created the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition, or Shield of the Americas, a security alliance to stop illegal immigration, Russian and Chinese interference, and “narco-terrorist gangs and cartels.” In his remarks at the March 7 opening summit, Trump insisted that “the only way to defeat these enemies is by unleashing the power (of) our militaries.”
Then, as now, this collaboration appears to be aimed at the leftist and communist governments in the Western Hemisphere.
In many cases, the drug framing is an explicit rationale for action. That was most recently on display with the U.S. designation of the two largest criminal gangs in Brazil as foreign terrorist organizations, leading Brazilian officials of the leftist Lula government to warn that any pretext for intervention would be “unacceptable.”
In other cases the administration’s argument is broader. The ratcheting up of military maneuvers, rhetoric and sanctions against Cuba – including declaring the island nation an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. security – has led many to speculate that Cuba is the next target of regime change.
While the narco-terrorism label may be applied selectively depending on the case, the result remains the fulfillment of anti-communist political objectives dating back to the Cold War.
The opinions expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any other part of the federal government.
