Stopping judges from considering “good character” references when sentencing sexual offenders – as New Zealand’s National Party has pledged to if re-elected – may sound like a niche legal reform.
But it targets a real and longstanding issue in the country’s criminal justice system – and one that has drawn renewed public attention and debate over recent months.
In the courts, character references are typically used to show a defendant has no prior history of similar offending. Lawyers may point to the absence of previous convictions and present supportive letters describing the assault as out of character.
Such evidence can be introduced by defendants convicted of – or pleading guilty to – sexual offending in a bid to reduce their sentence, alongside other mitigating discounts that judges can apply under the Sentencing Act.
National argues that its proposed reform, which comes alongside a separate petition and campaign, would lead to tougher sentences and stop offenders benefiting from their personal reputation or social standing.
Some defence lawyers, however, have argued judges already treat such evidence cautiously in serious sexual offending cases, and warn that removing it entirely could undermine the principle that courts should consider all relevant circumstances at sentencing.
In any case, the move would represent a meaningful change. But the discussion also raises wider questions about New Zealand’s sentencing framework itself – particularly when it comes to how much discretion judges are presently given.
The problems with ‘good character’ references
As Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith noted when announcing the move last month, good character references are often used to argue the offending was “the exception, not the rule”.
In sexual violence cases, this can involve employers, relatives or community figures portraying the defendant as an otherwise respectable person who made a one-off mistake.
Rape cases, particularly, illustrate the flaws in this type of reasoning. Presenting evidence of a defendant’s good character can reinforce the myth that there is a meaningful distinction between a “real rapist” and someone who has merely committed rape.
This framing also risks minimising the seriousness of sexual violence and obscuring the reality that most rapes are committed by someone known to the victim, often in private places and with little or no physical force.
Another problem is that this evidence can be deeply retraumatising for victims, who may have to watch the sentencing judge consider – and sometimes even credit – claims that the assault was less serious, or rather something more akin to a misunderstanding.
If the policy choice is between continuing to treat prior “good character” as mitigation in sexual violence cases, or scrapping it, the latter would arguably appear the sensible call.
But abolishing this single mitigating factor from the Sentencing Act – at least as it applies to sexual offences – still leaves many other issues within the legislation to address.
The case for wider reform
In another development last month, an advisory group was established to bring lived experience and leadership expertise into government decision-making around family and sexual violence prevention.
While this marks an important step, overseas experience suggests New Zealand could go much further in reforming its sentencing system.
Countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and many Australian states, for instance, use sentencing commissions to develop formal sentencing guidelines.
These bodies draw on expertise from criminology, psychology, statistics and criminal law to analyse research and sentencing data, then produce guidance on how different offences and offenders should be sentenced.
The resulting guidelines help to eliminate disparities across offences, offenders, judges, and geographic regions, while also ensuring transparency in sentencing policy. They also tend to rely more on evidence and risk-based assessment than on broad and often ambiguous factors gradually developed through court decisions.
By contrast, two-decade-old Sentencing Act appears antiquated.
Aggravating and mitigating factors referenced within the legislation are often intuitive, vague and morally framed, rather than being clearly defined or grounded in evidence.
Importantly, they also provide little meaningful guidance for how judges should apply them consistently across cases involving different levels of harm, premeditation or remorse on the part of the offender.
Leaving sentencing judges with such a high level of unguided discretion risks allowing implicit biases – which all people possess – to influence sentencing decisions.
The result is that subjective assessments about who seems dangerous, remorseful or respectable can end up driving sentencing decisions, rather than being based on consistent, evidence-based assessments of harm, proportionality and risk to public safety.
Removing “good character” mitigation in sexual violence cases may therefore be worthwhile. But if New Zealand wants a better sentencing system, much broader reform is required.
